28 research outputs found
Market Design for Generation Adequacy: Healing Causes rather than Symptoms
Keywords JEL Classification This paper argues that electricity market reform â particularly the need for complementary mechanisms to remunerate capacity â need to be analysed in the light of the local regulatory and institutional environment. If there is a lack of investment, the priority should be to identify the roots of the problem. The lack of demand side response, short-term reliability management procedures and uncompetitive ancillary services procurement often undermine market reflective scarcity pricing and distort long-term investment incentives. The introduction of a capacity mechanism should come as an optional supplement to wholesale and ancillary markets improvements. Priority reforms should focus on encouraging demand side responsiveness and reducing scarcity price distortions introduced by balancing and congestion management through better dialog between network engineers and market operators. electricity market, generation adequacy, market design, capacity mechanis
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Generation Adequacy and Investment Incentives in Britain: from the Pool to NETA
Three years after the controversial change of the British market design from compulsory Pool with capacity payments to decentralised energy-only New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) market framework, we compare the two designs in terms of investment incentives. We review the biases of the Pool capacity payments design, the drought of investment following the introduction of NETA, and the reaction of the market during the first âstress-testâ of NETA during the winter 2003. In an energy-only market such as NETA, it is essential that price signals are right and the system operator has a crucial role in contracting ahead for reserve. We recommend that NETA adopt a single marginal imbalance price as dual imbalance pricing distorts price signals in times of scarcity. The lack of long-term contracting that causes hedging and financing difficulties for power projects can becompensated by vertical and horizontal reintegration at a cost of increased market power
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Financing arrangements and industrial organisation for new nuclear build in electricity markets
National audienc
Nuclear Power: a Hedge against Uncertain Gas and Carbon Prices?
High fossil fuel prices have rekindled interest in nuclear power. This paper identifies specific nuclear characteristics making it unattractive to merchant generators in liberalised electricity markets, and argues that non-fossil fuel technologies have an overlooked Ă Ă¹à à à à option valueĂ Ă¹à à à à given fuel and carbon price uncertainty. Stochastic optimisation estimates the company option value of keeping open the choice between nuclear and gas technologies. This option value decreases sharply as the correlation between electricity, gas, and carbon prices rises, casting doubt on whether private investorsĂ Ă¹à à à à fuel-mix diversification incentives in electricity markets are aligned with the social value of a diverse fuel-mix
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Tehcnology Choices for New Entrants in Liberalised Markets: The Value of Operating Flexibility and Contractual Arrangements
New entrants in liberalised electricity markets which are not vertically integrated and do not operate a large and diversified portfolio of generation technologies are likely to favour technologies which offer the best prospects to manage fuel and electricity price risks through contractual arrangements and operating flexibility. Monte Carlo simulations of a discounted cash flow model of investment in combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), coal and nuclear power plant are run to compare the impact of fuel and electricity price risks on these different technologies, as well as the value of operating flexibility and contractual hedges. In the absence of long-term fixed-price power purchase contracts, CCGT is the least risky option as its cash flow is Ă¹à à self-hedgedĂ¹à à given the high correlation between electricity and gas prices observed in most markets. Moreover, the value associated with operating flexibility and arbitrage between gas and power market is greater for CCGT plant. This makes CCGT particularly attractive to new entrants
Market design for generation adequacy: Healing causes rather than symptoms
This paper argues that electricity market reform - particularly the need for complementary mechanisms to remunerate capacity - need to be analysed in the light of the local regulatory and institutional environment. If there is a lack of investment, the priority should be to identify the roots of the problem. The lack of demand-side response, short-term reliability management procedures and non-market ancillary services provision often undermine market reflective scarcity pricing and distort long-term investment incentives. The introduction of a capacity mechanism should come as an optional supplement to wholesale and ancillary markets improvements. Priority reforms should focus on encouraging demand-side responsiveness and reducing scarcity price distortions introduced by balancing and congestion management through better dialog between network engineers and market operators.
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Price Cap Regulation and Investment Incentives under Demand Uncertainty
We study the effect of price cap regulation on investment in new capacity in an oligopolistic (Cournot) industry, using a continuous time model with stochastic demand. A price cap has two mutually competing effects on investment under demand uncertainty: it makes the option of deferring investment very valuable, but it also reduces the interest of strategic underinvestment to raise prices. We show that there exists an optimal price cap that maximizes investment incentives. As with deterministic demand, the optimal price cap is the clearing price of the competitive market. However, unlike the deterministic case, we show that such a price cap does not restore the competitive equilibrium; there is still under-investment. Sensitivity analyses and Monte Carlo simulations show that the efficiency of price cap regulation depends critically on demand volatility and that errors in the choice of the price cap can have detrimental consequences on investment and average prices